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NOTES AND COMMENTS




The recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in Marti-
nez v. Californial examined the practice of granting state parole offi-
cials unqualified immunity from civil suit.2 After Martinez, states may
continue to immunize their parole officials from causes of action based
on state law that are generated by decisions to parole prisoners who
later kill or injure other persons. Nevertheless, the Court qualified its
ruling by intimating that actions brought under section 1983 of the
Civil Rights Act3 may preclude state official immunity, even though
such immunity would otherwise be effective against state law actions.'
This recharacterization of section 1983 may pave the way for victims of
1. 444 U.S. 277 (1980).
2. See generally Johnson v. Wells, 566 F.2d 1016, 1018 (5th Cir. 1978) (parole officials im-
mune from suit under the Civil Rights Act); Franklin v. Shields, 569 F.2d 784, 798 (4th Cir. 1977)
(parole board members who perform a quasi-judicial function immune from suit for damages
under Civil Rights Act), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1003 (1978); Thompson v. Burke, 556 F.2d 231, 236-
40 (3d Cir. 1977) (qualified immunity held to protect parole officials acting in good faith); Pope v.
Chew, 521 F.2d 400, 405 (4th Cir. 1975) (parole board members who perform a quasi-judicial
function immune from damages under Civil Rights Act); Diaz v. Ward, 437 F. Supp. 678, 688
(S.D.N.Y. 1977) (application of eleventh amendment immunity); Pate v. Alabama Bd. of Pardons
& Paroles, 409 F. Supp. 478, 479 (N.D. Ala. 1976) (parole officials absolutely immune from suit
under the Civil Rights Act); Palermo v. Rockefeller, 323 F. Supp. 478, 484 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (pa-
role boards not immune from suit based on Civil Rights Act); Paige v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Parole,
311 F. Supp. 940, 941 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (parole board members are immune from suits based on
Civil Rights Act).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. IV 1980).
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any state or territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action of law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this section, any act of Congress
applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of
the District of Columbia.
Id
4. 444 U.S. at 284 & n.8. The Supreme Court noted in dictum:
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crimes committed by parolees to seek federal statutory redress against
state parole officials.
This note traces the development of official immunity in the wake
of Martinez and similar decisions that have criticized the application of
that doctrine to state parole officials.5  Particularly significant is a re-
cent state supreme court ruling that eliminates absolute immunity for
parole officials who are grossly negligent or reckless in their decisions
to release prisoners.6 In addition, the effectiveness of tort actions
against state parole officials7 is contrasted against the effectiveness of
suing parole officials under section 1983. That section's possible impor-
tance in undermining official immunity is assessed in the context of an
analysis that plaintiffs might use in formulating viable actions against
negligent parole officials. Finally, this note explores the difficult issue
of legal duty typically associated with litigation involving the release of
mentally disturbed offenders8 and which is applicable in suits against
parole officials.9
Conduct by persons acting under color of state law which is wrongful under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. . . cannot be immunized by state law. A construction of the federal stat-
ute which permitted a state immunity defense to have controlling effect would transmute
a basic guarantee into an illusory promise; and the supremacy clause of the Constitution
insures that the proper construction may be enforced .... The immunity claim raises a
question of federal law.
Id (dictum) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
5. Although this note uses the terms parole board and parole official interchangeably, the
exact language of § 1983 provides for civil redress only when the constitutional violation com-
plained of is perpetrated by a person. Many courts have thus refused to extend the section to
violations allegedly perpetrated by a parole board, interpreting the section to be inapplicable to
entities. See, e.g., Diaz v. Ward, 437 F. Supp. 678, 688 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Paige v. Pennsylvania
Bd. of Parole, 311 F. Supp. 940, 941 (E.D. Pa. 1970); Gallagher v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation
& Parole, 287 F. Supp. 610, 610-11 (E.D. Pa. 1968). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court recently
reemphasized that the term person is sufficiently broad to include governmental entities and ap-
plied the section accordingly. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 635 (1980) (citing
Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978)). Before Monell, the dis-
tinction between a parole board and parole officials was significant because complaints framed
against parole boards were subject to dismissal in jurisdictions subscribing to the less expansive
interpretation of the word "person." See, e.g., Paige v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Parole, 311 F. Supp.
at 941 (parole board not a person within the meaning of the Civil Rights Act).
6. See Grimm v. Arizona Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 115 Ariz. 260, 564 P.2d 1227 (1977).
7. While this note makes references to the federal parole system and compares state and
federal systems, no attempt is made to address the additional issues and complications raised in
actions against federal parole officials.
8. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 319, Comment a, Illustration 2
(1965).
9. Id § 448, Comment a, Illustration 1, referring to the situation in which an actor is held
liable for the criminal act of a third party where that actor created the condition giving rise to the
harm and either knew, or should have known, that the third party would cause the harm. Id
2
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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
After a California court convicted Richard Thomas of forcible
rape in 1969, therapists labeled him a mentally disordered sex offender
not amenable to treatment.' ° He was sentenced to prison for a maxi-
mum term of twenty years. Five years later, parole officials released
Thomas on the condition that he regularly report to a parole out-pa-
tient clinic. Thomas subsequently kidnapped, tortured, and brutally
murdered fifteen year old Mary Ellen Martinez.
Survivors then sued the State of California and the parole officials
who released Thomas for numerous civil rights violations,"1 basing the
actions on section 1983 of title 42.12 They also alleged that the parole
decision was reckless, and requested damages for the alleged wrongful
death of the decedent.
1 3
The parole officials argued that they were specifically protected
from liability for their parole decision by a California immunity stat-
ute.' 4 They filed a demurrer which was sustained at trial, without leave
to amend, on the basis of the immunity statute.
15
The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction af-
ter the California Supreme Court denied the plaintiffs' petition for a
hearing.' 6 Justice Stevens, speaking for the majority, rejected the argu-
ment that the immunity statute deprived the decedent of her right to
life protected by the due process clause. 7 According to Justice Stevens,
the statute had only an incremental impact on the probability of her
death and neither authorized nor immunized deliberate killing. He
noted that all parole systems involve a basic risk of recidivism and that
immunity merely increases that risk.i" Without proof of direct causa-
10. 444 U.S. at 279.
11. Id at 281-82.
12. Id See note 3 supra and accompanying text.
13. 85 Cal. App. 3d 433, 434, 149 Cal. Rptr. 519, 522 (1978).
14. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 845.8(a) (West 1980). This section provides: "Neither a public en-
tity nor a public employee is liable for: (a) Any injury resulting from determining whether to
parole or release a prisoner or from determining the terms and conditions of his parole or release
or from determining whether to revoke his parole or release." Id See also id § 820.2.
15. 444 U.S. at 280.
16. 441 U.S. 960 (1979).
17. 444 U.S. at 281.
18. The Court acknowledged the existence of a causal relationship between the California
immunity statute and the risk of recidivism, but rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the immu-
nity statute had contributed directly to the decedent's death. The Court stated:
The statute neither authorized nor immunized the deliberate killing of any human
being. It is not the equivalent of a death penalty statute which expressly authorizes state
agents to take a person's life after prescribed procedures have been observed. This stat-
ute merely provides a defense to potential state tort liability. At most, the availability of
1980]
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tion, the Court found no state action depriving the decedent of a right
secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.' 9
The Court also rejected the argument that the immunity statute
unconstitutionally deprived the plaintiffs of a property right to a
wrongful death claim allegedly protected by the due process clause.
Even if it were assumed that the wrongful death claim were property
within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment, Justice Stevens
noted that deprivations are not necessarily unconstitutional. 20  Here,
California's interest in encouraging uninhibited decisionmaking by pa-
role officials was thought to be rationally related to an immunity policy
that reasonable lawmakers might favor.2' Consequently, the immunity
statute was held to be a complete defense against state law actions, ab-
solutely shielding parole officials from personal liability for their re-
lease decisions.22
In considering the claim that section 1983 afforded the plaintiffs a
cause of action, Justice Stevens emphasized that section 1983 was latent
until triggered by the violation of a constitutionally protected personal
right.23 In order to raise a constitutional issue, the violation must stem
from state action.24 In the Court's view, although "the decision to re-
such a defense may have encouraged members of the parole board to take somewhat
greater risks of recidivism in exercising their authority to release prisoners than they
otherwise might. But the basic risk that repeat offenses may occur is always present in
any parole system.
Id
19. Id at 283.
20. Arguably, the cause of action for wrongful death that the State has created is a spe-
cies of "property" protected by the Due Process Clause. On that hypothesis, the immu-
nity statute could be viewed as depriving the plaintiffs of that property interest insofar as
they seek to assert a claim against parole officials. But even if one characterizes the
immunity defense as a statutory deprivation, it would remain true that the State's interest
in fashioning its own rules of tort law is paramount to any discernible federal interest,
except perhaps an interest in protecting the individual citizen from state action that is
wholly arbitrary or irrational.
Id at 281-82 (footnote omitted). Nevertheless, the Court's concern with protecting state auton-
omy diminished when the question was presented whether California's immunity statute barred
recovery under § 1983. Id at 283-88. See note 23 infra and accompanying text.
21. 444 U.S. at 283.
22. Id
23. Justice Stevens distinguished between state law actions and actions based on the United
States Constitution or on federal statutes. While state official immunity was held to be an affirma-
tive defense to state law actions, Justice Stevens suggested that state official immunity may be
totally or partially ineffective against federally derived actions. 444 U.S. at 284 & n.8. This posi-
tion, even though dictum, is markedly opposed to the many cases that have carved exceptions into
§ 1983. See, e.g., Thompson v. Burke, 556 F.2d 231, 236 (3d Cir. 1977), which rejected the argu-
ment that § 1983 defeats official immunity. "It seems almost unnecessary to state that very numer-
ous exceptions [to liability] have been carved out of the apparently absolute terms of§ 1983." Id
at 236 (citation omitted).
24. 444 U.S. at 284.
4
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lease Thomas. . . was action by the State, the action of Thomas five
months later [could not] fairly be characterized as state action."2
Hence, the constitutional violation required to invoke section 1983 was
not established.26 This prompted the Court to affirm the judgment of
the California Court of Appeals that had dismissed the complaint.
Although Martinez expressly permits states to immunize their pa-
role officials from liability for reckless or negligent decisionmaking, the
decision also suggests that there might be limits to that power. The
Court stressed, for example, that official immunity might be barred
from use in suits in which the elements of section 1983 are estab-
lished.27 Once that section is triggered, official immunity might fold
under the weight of the supremacy clause.28 State parole officials
would then be subject to personal liability for negligent release deci-
sions.2 9
III. THE DOCTRINE OF OFFICIAL IMMUNITY BEFORE
M4RTINEZ V CALIFORNIA
Because Martinez declined to question the propriety of state offi-
cial immunity, the decision typifies the deference historically accorded
state law by the federal bench after the demise of substantive due proc-
ess in 1948.30 Under Martinez, states may legitimately immunize their
parole officials from state law actions brought by victims of parolees.3'
Nevertheless, the possibility that section 1983 actions can undermine
state official immunity implies that state interests that conffict with fed-
eral interests may today enjoy less judicial deference than has tradi-
25. Id at 285.
26. Id
27. Id
28. The Court's conclusion that the supremacy clause precludes immunity of officials from
actions based on alleged violations of§ 1983 was dictum, since § 1983 was not found to have been
violated by the decision to grant parole. Nevertheless, the conclusion represents a clear departure
from strong precedent that had imposed numerous exceptions upon § 1983. See cases in note 2
./upra.
29. 444 U.S. at 284 & n.8. Martinez stressed that state immunity statutes are subject to pre-
emption under the supremacy clause, but it is unclear whether total preemption is necessary. In-
stead, the Court expressly reserved "the question of what immunity, if any, a state parole officer
has in a § 1983 action where a constitutional violation is made out by the allegations." Id at 285
n.l 1. Had such a violation been established, the Court could have elected to afford absolute im-
munity or, in the alternative, qualified immunity. Finally, it could have elected to deny any im-
munity. For an excellent discussion of the various alternatives in granting official immunity, see
McCormack & Kirkpatrick, Immunities of State Officials Under Section 1983, 8 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 65
(1976).
30. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW § 8-7 (1978).
31. 444 U.S. at 282.
1980]
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tionally been true. An examination of the development and policies of
judicial and quasi-judicial immunity confirms this point, and evidences
in the context of parole decisionmaking a shift in the division of powers
away from unbridled state autonomy.
A. Judicial Immunity and the Emergence of Quasi-Judicial Immunity
Judicial immunity is a product of the belief that liability for faulty
judicial decisions would cripple the judiciary.32 The doctrine abso-
lutely immunizes judges from personal liability for acts committed by
them in pursuit of official duties.3 3 For the most part, judicial immu-
nity is perceived as a catalyst of vigorous and efficient judicial action,
protecting judges from suits which might otherwise undermine in-
formed, responsible, and judicious decisionmaking.34
Several cases highlight the successful incorporation of judicial im-
munity into American jurisprudence. In 1810, the New York Court of
Appeals held in Yates v. Lansing35 that judges were immune from ac-
tions attacking official decisions.36 Sixty years later, the United States
Supreme Court endorsed Yates in Bradley v. Fisher,37 thereby immu-
nizing judges from suit for their official acts, even if committed in the
wake of malice or corruption.38
As the size and complexity of government increased, many admin-
istrators assumed highly discretionary responsibilities which, as was
true with judges, required a forceful application of professional judg-
ment.39 With increasing frequency, this development precipitated the
32. See Jennings, Tort LiabllityforAdminisrative Officers, 21 MINN. L. REV. 263, 271 (1937).
33. Judicial immunity is usually absolute, applicable in all instances without qualification.
The only recognized exception is when a judge exceeds the clear scope of his jurisdiction. See,
e.g., Gilbert v. Corcoran, 530 F.2d 820, 821 (8th Cir. 1976); Lynch v. Johnson, 420 F.2d 818, 820
(6th Cir. 1970). Older cases limited the doctrine by suggesting that it would not protect a judge
whose conduct had been corrupt or malicious. See, e.g., Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. (6 Wall.)
523, 535-36 (1868). But this exception failed to attract support and has been almost universally
abandoned. See, e.g., Duba v. Mcintyre, 501 F.2d 590, 591-92 (8th Cir. 1974); Cadena v. Perasso,
498 F.2d 383-84 (9th Cir. 1974); Burgess v. Towne, 13 Wash. App. 954, -, 538 P.2d 559, 562
(1975).
34. In recent years judicial immunity has been increasingly attacked. For a survey of the
literature, see Note, Judicial Immunity and Judicial Misconduct: A Proposalfor Limited Liability,
20 ARIZ. L. REV. 549 (1978); Note, Immunity of Federal and State Judges/rom Civil Suft-Timefor
a Qualpfed Immunity, 27 CASE W.L. REv. 727 (1977); Note, Judicial Immunity. An Unqual#ed
Sanction of Tyrannyfrom the Bench, 30 U. FLA. L. REV. 810 (1978).
35. 5 Johns. 282 (N.Y. 1810).
36. Id
37. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871).
38. Id at 347; see note 33 supra and accompanying text.
39. See Jennings, supra note 32, at 269. In Jennings' view, "modern economic, industrial,
technological, and social forces have increased the complexity of the problems with which govern-
[Vol. 16:229
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extension of immunity to persons who were not judges but who re-
quired the protection of immunity in order to make their decisions ef-
fectively.4"
The applicability of immunity to nonjudges soon turned on the
scope of the official discretion exercised by the government official. 4
Judges today remain absolutely immune from suit because of the wide
scope of their discretion.42 Conversely, officials whose duties are
predominantly ministerial enjoy no immunity from suit.43  Between
these extremes are officials whose administrative responsibilities re-
quire moderate discretion in decisionmaking. 44 This is the level at
which official immunity emerged and to which it is still applied today.
The doctrine of official immunity was extended to federal parole
officials as early as 1937. In Lang v. Wood,45 parole officials were sued
for revoking the plaintiff's parole without granting a prior hearing. The
court held that parole officials should be immune from suit under the
doctrine of official immunity. 46 Later, in Silver v. Dickson,47 the plain-
tiff brought a section 1983 action against California parole officials on
the ground that they had illegally denied his petition for parole. The
Ninth Circuit held that state parole officials performed a quasi-judicial
function when processing parole applications and that they were im-
mune from suits challenging their official decisions.48
After the doctrine of official immunity attracted support at the fed-
eral level many states followed suit. In Connecticut, for example, state
employees enjoy statutory immunity from actions based on the per-
formance of official duties. 49 Other states have enacted statutes specifi-
cally immunizing parole officials from suits based on injuries inflicted
by paroled prisoners.5"
ments have to deal, and largely as the consequence thereof, modem public law evolution has...
thrust upon the administrative branch a fusion of the threefold governmental functions." Id
(footnote omitted).
40. Id
41. See, e.g., Barr v. Mateo, 360 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1959).
42. See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
43. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 69 Cal. 2d 782, -, 447 P.2d 352, 362, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240, 250
(1968).
44. Id
45. 92 F.2d 211 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 686 (1937).
46. Id at 212.
47. 403 F.2d 642 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 990 (1969).
48. Id at 643.
49. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 4-165 (West 1969 & Supp. 1980).
50. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 845.8(a)-(b) (West 1980). The Law Revision Commission
comment states that the purpose of this section is to protect public officials from liability so that
1980]
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Despite the swift extension of official immunity to parole officials,
there are valid reasons for criticizing its application to parole decision-
making. The extension of the doctrine to parole officials is attributable
to superficial comparisons between parole officials and judges.5 Very
few courts predicated their findings of immunity on a coherent and ar-
ticulate analysis of the relationship between the policies of parole and
the impact of immunity on the implementation of those policies. Only
recently have courts seriously questioned the validity of the proposition
that parole officials are the analogue of judges. 2
B. Parole Decisionmaking as an Exception to the Doctrine of
Absolute Immunity
1. The Distinction Between Judges and Parole Officials: The
Grimm Decision
Parole decisionmaking closely resembles judicial decisionmak-
ing,53 but there are important distinctions which dictate that parole offi-
cials not be accorded the same unqualified immunity. It would be
preferable if parole officials enjoyed a qualified immunity under which
liability would be possible if the official acts recklessly in releasing a
potentially dangerous prisoner. Support for this position is found in
Grimm v. Arizona Bd of Pardons & Paroles.4 In that case, Arizona
parole officials released a prisoner who later robbed a Tucson tavern,
murdered one man, and critically injured another. The decedent's par-
ents, together with the injured man, sued Arizona parole officials for
gross negligence and recklessness in releasing the prisoner. The trial
judge rendered summary judgment for the parole officials on the
ground that quasi-judicial immunity precluded relief. The intermedi-
ate court of appeals affirmed.
The Arizona Supreme Court reversed the decision under a theory
of qualified immunity. Parole officials, reasoned the court, were subject
to personal liability if the release decision was grossly negligent or reck-
less.55 Four considerations prompted this conclusion. First, the court
they will be "unfettered by any fear that their decisions may result in liability." Id Law Revision
Commission Comment.
51. See Grimm v. Arizona Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 115 Ariz. 260, -, 564 P.2d 1227, 1231
(1977).
52. Id at -, 564 P.2d at 1231-32.
53. See Silver v. Dickson, 403 F.2d 642, 643-44 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 990
(1969). But see United States ex rel Harrison v. Pace, 380 F. Supp. 107, 111 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
54. 115 Ariz. 260, 564 P.2d 1227 (1977).
55. Id at -, 564 P.2d at 1232.
[Vol. 16:229
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stated that parole officials are not judges and intimated that they do not
always share a judge's duty to act in the public interest.5 6 Second, al-
though parole decisions involve wide official discretion, it was felt that
parole proceedings are not judicial proceedings.57 Absolute immunity,
said the court, should only protect those officials who are required to
make decisions without reasonable criteria in circumstances under
which vigorous decisionmaking is essential. 8 Only judges, not parole
officials, were deemed to satisfy this rigorous standard.59 Third, the
court stressed that the extension of unqualified immunity to parole and
other administrative officials was marked by a dubious judicial evolu-
tion of questionable logic and reasoning. It criticized past tendencies to
equate the acts of administrators with the decisions of judges. 60  Fi-
nally, the court held that although parole officials normally owe a duty
of care only to society and not to particular persons, that broad duty
narrows when officials take charge of a dangerous person.61 This
meant that parole officials were under a legal duty of care to particular
persons, not just to society as a whole, to act reasonably when deciding
whether to release a potentially dangerous individual.6 z
The Grimm decision illustrates one method of testing the applica-
bility of immunity to nonjudges. This method subjects to close scrutiny
the points of similarity between judges and adjudicative administrators
such as parole officials. If those points of similarity are absent, then
immunity is denied or, as was the case in Grimm, its potency is quali-
fied. An alternative method to the Grimm approach would ask whether
56. Id (by implication).
57. The court found that the decision to grant or to deny parole is made in proceedings that
do not entail the procedural protections available in judicial proceedings. In parole decisions, the
court stressed that certain due process requirements may be inapplicable. It was also emphasized
that "the major judicial safeguard of appellate review is often totally lacking." I4
58. Id
59. Id
60. The court criticized the application of official immunity to public officials as a "perver-
sion of earlier reasoning." Id at -, 564 P.2d at 1231. It also criticized the development for
having occurred "in the context of logical inconsistencies and often with only cursory reasoning."
Id (citation omitted). The most significant aspect of Grimm was not its attack on parole officials,
but its attack on the American administrative bureaucracy, an attack which permeated the court's
opinion. At one point, the court admitted that it had reached its conclusion "because of the in-
creasing power of the bureaucracy--the administrators-in our society. The authority wielded by
so-called faceless bureaucrats has often been criticized." Id at -, 564 P.2d at 1233.
61. Id at -, 564 P.2d at 1234.
62. In finding that the defendant had been under a legal duty of care in its parole decisions,
the court relied on the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 319. Section 319 provides that "[o]ne who
takes charge of a third person whom he knows or should know to be likely to cause bodily harm to
others if not controlled is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to control the third person to
prevent him from doing such harm." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 319 (1965).
19801
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the decision to grant parole is in itself sufficiently discretionary to war-
rant the broad protection of official immunity.
2. Parole Decisionmaking Examined
Experts disagree on the definition of parole, but generally it is de-
fined as "the release of an offender from a penal or correctional institu-
tion after he has served a portion of his sentence, under the continued
custody of the state and under conditions that permit his reincarcera-
tion in the event of misbehavior."63 The validity of parole is condi-
tioned largely on the accuracy of three assumptions: (1) that offenders
can be rehabilitated;64 (2) that offenders will not be released if they
constitute a threat to the safety of others,65 and; (3) that parole boards
have the ability to predict when an offender is no longer dangerous.66
In considering whether immunity should be granted to parole offi-
cials, it is significant that numerous studies have challenged the accu-
racy of the above assumptions.67 Moreover, the proponents of absolute
official immunity for parole officials rely specifically on the view that
consistently accurate prediction has not been realized. 68  They argue
63. O'Leary, Parole Administration, in D. GLASER, HANDBOOK OF CRIMINOLOGY 909 (1974).
64. See F. EVRAD, SUCCESSFUL PAROLE 106 (1971).
65. Id
66. See, e.g., L. CARNEY, PROBATION & PAROLE, LEGAL & SOCIAL DIMENSIONS 182 (1977).
The precise meaning of prediction is unclear. In the context of parole, prediction has been defined
as "an estimate of the probability of violation or nonviolation of parole by an offender on the
basis of experience tables.. ." Legins, Parole Prediction-An Introductory Comment, in B. KAY
& C. VEDDER, PROBATION & PAROLE 125 (1963). Other experts have been hesitant to formulate
any definition, arguing that parole prediction is susceptible to varied meaning: "If the term pre-
diction means anything, it cannot refer to a method of analysis. The predictions that may be made
are made by inference... on a basis of evidence of varying quality and type, and the methods for
dealing with these types of data may vary widely." L. WILKINS, EVALUATION OF PENAL MEAS-
URES 61 (1964).
67. For a brief discussion of the view that rehabilitation has failed, see L. CARNEY, supra
note 66, at 215-17. See also Citizens' Inquiry on Parole and Criminal Justice, Report an New York
Parole: A Summary, 11 CRIM. L. BULL. 273 (1975):
Parole is generally viewed as an idealistic concept. Its announced purposes seek
simultaneously to protect the public and to give the criminal offender a new chance.
These noble purposes have not been realized, and the most basic finding of the study
reported here is that [parole] renders American treatment of those who break society's
rules irrational and arbitrary.
Id at 274 (footnote omitted). Added to the concern that rehabilitation has failed is the concern
that prediction has failed, and that parole prematurely releases dangerous prisoners. Id at 287-
88.
68. In Tarasoffv. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14
(1976) (psychotherapist liability for failure to warn foreseeable victim), the principal thrust of the
amicus argument, representing the American Psychiatric Association, was that the imposition of a
duty of care upon psychotherapists is unreasonable because "therapists cannot accurately predict
whether or not a patient will resort to violence." Id at -, 551 P.2d at 344, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 24.
The argument relied upon studies indicating that "therapists, in the present state of the art, are
10
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that release decisions are discretionary because they involve many in-
tangibles, and that parole officials should be immunized from suits that
challenge their decisions.69
Although predictions of dangerousness are sometimes inaccurate,
it does not necessarily follow that release decisions are always discre-
tionary or that parole officials are incapable of negligent or reckless
parole decisions. The role of discretion in parole decisionmaking can
be clarified only by examining the process of determining parole suita-
bility. The results reveal that the question whether parole officials
should be granted immunity is hinged on the nature of the parole deci-
sion process and on the particular circumstances that surround a re-
lease.
Parole is intended to accelerate the release of individuals from
prison based upon a measurement of the risk of recidivism and the
subsequent justification of that risk.7" This process entails two steps.
First, the parole board must calculate the seriousness of the risk of re-
cidivism. That is, it must determine whether the parolee might commit
unable reliably to predict violent acts; their forecasts. . . tend consistently to overpredict violence,
and'indeed are more wrong than right." Ia Hence, the argument requested that the court "not
render rulings that predicate the liability of therapists upon the validity of such predictions." Id
at -, 551 P.2d 345, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 25. The California Supreme Court, in rejecting this argu-
ment, stated:
The role of the psychiatrist, who is indeed a practitioner of medicine, and that of the
psychologist who performs an allied function, are like that of the physician who must
conform to the standards of the profession and who must often make diagnoses and
predictions based upon such evaluations. Thus the judgment of the therapist in diagnos-
ig emotional disorders and in predicting whether a patient presents a serious danger of
violence is comparable to the judgment which doctors and professionals must regularly
render under accepted rules of responsibility.
Id
Another frequently used argument against the imposition of liability for negligent parole
release decisions is that too many factors are involved in such decisions. The argument thus as-
sumes that reasonable minds might always differ in the decision whether to grant or deny parole.
Cf. Pate v. Alabama Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 409 F. Supp. 478, 479 (N.D. Ala. 1976) (parole
release decision is similar to judge's decision to sentence or to grant or deny probation).
69. See, eg., Pate v. Alabama Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 409 F. Supp. 478 (N.D. Ala. 1976).
In Pate, the district court held that parole officials were immune from suit under the doctrine of
official immunity and the eleventh amendment's immunity provision. Id at 479. It also found
that parole officials "bear a more than ordinary responsibility because of the dangerous traits
already demonstrated by those with whom they must deal." Id Such a responsibility "imposes far
greater moral burdens and requires far more difficult legal choices than those met by the average
administrative officer." Id But cf. Rieser v. District of Columbia, 563 F.2d 462, 475 (D.C. Cir.
1977) (parole officer's failure to warn employment placement service of parolee's conviction for
rape held to be a ministerial act to which immunity did not attach), modofed, 580 F.2d 647 (1978)
(ancillary issue).
70. See National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards, Report on Correc-
lions (1973), in G. KILLINGER & P. CROMWELL, JR., CORRECTIONS IN THE COMMUNITY 249-52
(1974).
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a crime or an infraction of parole conditions that could precipitate the
revocation of parole." There must, in addition, be a calculation of the
seriousness of the crime that might be committed. 72 For purposes of
making the release decision, the inmate who has on previous occasions
demonstrated a propensity for violence would probably be treated dif-
ferently than the inmate convicted of a nonviolent offense such as em-
bezzlement.73 Second, the parole board must determine whether a
decision to release, actually an assumption of the risk calculated in the
previous step, would be socially justified.74
Many commentators have ignored the implications of these dis-
tinct steps which together comprise the ultimate decision to release.
The result is that the steps are mistakenly commingled by parole offi-
cials and by courts called upon to review parole decisions. This is un-
fortunate since, for the purpose of determining whether parole officials
should be granted official immunity,75 it conceals the fact that each step
requires an independent exercise of discretion. Courts, therefore,
should not grant immunity to parole officials until each step in the deci-
sional process is independently reviewed and evaluated in accord with
separate judicial standards tailored to the uniqueness of each step.
In many parole decisions, the calculation of the risk of recidivism
is a ministerial and not a discretionary task.76 Such a calculation is
ministerial where the record reveals that, if the prisoner is paroled,
there is a high risk that he or she will return to a life of crime.7 7 Argua-
71. Id at 250.
72. Id
73. See National Council on Crime & Delinquency, Guidesfor Parole Selection (1963), in L.
ORLAND, JUSTICE, PUNISHMENT, TREATMENT-THE CORRECTIONAL PROCESS 427, 427-28 (1973).
74. Social justification in release decisionmaking requires the consideration of many issues.
The following list is by no means complete: whether the prisoner would benefit from further
institutionalization; whether further institutionalization would make the prisoner a worse risk;
whether sufficient punishment has been imposed; and whether the prisoner's family would be
adversely affected by the decision. See Report on Corrections, supra note 70, at 250.
75. Ministerial and discretionary acts are best conceptualized as points along a single judg-
mental continuum. For this reason, confusion results when they are treated as separate concepts.
See Note, Torts-Parole Board Members Have Only Quai/led Immunityfor Decision to Release
Prisoner, 46 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1301, 1303 & n.24 (1978). The question, in this light, is not
whether an act is ministerial or discretionary. The inquiry should address the entire continuum-
how much discretion is being used and should that discretion be used? See, e.g., Johnson v. State,
69 Cal. 2d 782,-, 447 P.2d 352,357, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240, 245 (1968) (distinction between discretion-
ary and ministerial acts is determined by policy considerations).
76. The determination whether an act is ministerial or discretionary depends on the test used.
One test makes an act discretionary if it formulates policy, and ministerial if it implements policy.
See Thompson v. Burke, 556 F.2d 231, 237-38 (3d Cir. 1977). It can be argued that in many
instances parole officials do not formulate policy when they predict whether a prisoner will or will
not commit a serious crime if paroled.
77. It is also follows that where reasonable minds might differ in determining the risk of
[Vol. 16:229
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bly, parole officials abuse their discretion when a high risk prisoner is
released unless, despite the high risk, the board determines that the
value of the release outweighs the risk. But such determinations, really
the second step in the parole process, are possible only through deliber-
ate and informed analysis of social benefits and costs.78
In determining whether parole officials should be granted immu-
nity, reviewing courts should decide whether the release decision was
the product of a reasoned cost-benefit analysis.79 If the court deter-
mines that the release decision was the product of such an analysis,
then the officials should be granted immunity because of the discretion-
ary character of that task. Conversely, if the court finds that the parole
board's analysis was cursory and insubstantial, made hastily without
reasonable deliberation in the company of a high risk of potentially
serious recidivism, then the court should find that the board abused its
discretion and deny official immunity."0
recidivism, courts should consider the decision a discretionary act. See Grimm v. Arizona Bd. of
Pardons & Paroles, 115 Ariz. 260, -, 564 P.2d 1227, 1234 (1977).
78. For a discussion of the trade-offs between the social benefit of parole release and the
social cost of recidivism, see W. PARKER, PAROLE-ORIGINS, DEVELOPMENT, CURRENT PRAC-
TICES & STATUTEs 26 (rev. ed. 1975).
79. See notes 74 & 78 supra.
80. The most significant recent case to hold that parole decisionmaking is a ministerial task
was Payton v. United States, 49 U.S.L.W. 2521 (5th Cir. Feb. 2, 1981), where the court held that
the United States Board of Parole had no discretion to ignore parole eligibility criteria when
making release decisions. Id In Payton, a wrongful death action was brought against the United
States on the ground that its employee, the Board of Parole (now the United States Parole Com-
mission), negligently paroled an alleged paranoid schizophrenic who subsequently murdered the
plaintiff's decedent. 468 F. Supp. 651, 651 (1979). The district court disregarded the significance
of evidence that the Board of Parole had failed to obtain and review all records which, pursuant to
regulations, were required to be considered. Id at 651-52, 656. Accordingly, the court dismissed
the case on the ground that parole decisions fall within the discretionary function exception to the
Federal Tort Claims Act. Id at 656.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's ruling and held that the United
States was liable for the decedent's death. 49 U.S.L.W. at 2521. The court stated:
The present administration of the parole system. . . is carried on in a somewhat
ministerialfashion at a low level within the agency. The process requires the hearing
examiner to review the records, add up pre-identified salient characteristics of the of-
fender and to compare this to a largely predetermined offense severity rating in order to
find the appropriate time frame for release. If not a totallyfixed and mechanicalprocess,
this certainly comes very close to being decisionmaking "between the limits ofpositive rules
* * * subject... to review."
Id at 2521 (citation omitted)(emphasis added). The court went on to say that psychiatric evalua-
tions "are not a policy-making function." Id Noting that the Board ignored statutory eligibility
criteria, the court emphasized that "a release in total disregard of known propensities for repetitive
brutal behavior is not an abuse of discretion but rather an act completely outside of clear statutory
limitations." Id
The Payton approach is consistent with the approach followed in Grimm which permitted
liability of parole officials for grossly negligent or reckless parole decisions. Grimm v. Arizona
Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 115 Ariz. 260,-, 564 P.2d 1227, 1234 (1977). Unlike Grimm, however,
13
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Although it may be difficult to predict with mathematical precision
whether a particular parole candidate is dangerous, it does not neces-
sarily follow that reasoned parole decisions are impossible or that re-
cidivism tables are unreliable prediction aids."' Social scientists have
developed many devices and guidelines for intelligently assessing risk,
such as the salient factor score,82 which aid parole officials in release
decisions.8 Such devices are valuable in revealing whether a particular
inmate is a poor parole risk.84 Where scores cannot be misinterpreted
without serious error, an assessment that an inmate is a poor risk
should be treated by courts as a ministerial decision. If the release de-
cision evidences obvious negligence in risk assessment calculations, pa-
role officials should not be accorded official immunity.85
Many parole decisions that are today treated as discretionary deci-
sions should be treated as ministerial decisions to which official immu-
nity should not attach. Decisions should be treated as ministerial when
parole officials elect to ignore available release criteria, when they are
poorly or inadequately trained to make such decisions, or when deci-
sions are made arbitrarily without reliance on accessible data about the
parole candidate. Courts that grant immunity to parole officials on the
ground that accurate prediction is impossible endorse the exercise of
official discretion to abandon reasonable release criteria. Immunity for
administrative officials was never intended to promote the uninformed
Payton directly attacked the classical proposition that parole decisions are always discretionary.
49 U.S.L.W. at 2521. For this reason, Payton represents a more significant attack on the applica-
tion of the doctrine of official immunity to parole officials.
81. See, e.g., Cohen, Groth, & Siegel, The ClinicalPrediction of.Dangerousness, 24 CRIME &
DELINQUENCY 28, 37-39 (1978).
82. See Paroling, Recommiting, and Supervising Federal Prisoners, 28 C.F.R. § 2.20 (1979).
Even the salient factor score, which is currently employed by the United States Parole Commis-
sion, is not characterized as a device for predicting recidivism. It serves merely "as an aid in
determining the parole prognosis (potential risk of parole violation)." Id § 2.20(e). It is neverthe-
less an extremely valuable guideline since officials may not override the score in parole decisions
without first articulating the reasons for its disregard, and even then they must commit those
reasons to writing. The ultimate purpose of the salient factor score, along with an array of other
guidelines, is to "promote a more consistent exercise of discretion, and enable fairer and more
equitable decision-making. . ." Id For an excellent discussion of the salient factor score, see
Hoffman & Adelberg, The Salient Factor Score: A Nontechnical Overview, 44 FED. PROBATION 44
(1980).
83. For a discussion of the problems in interpreting the causal relationship between in-
dependent and dependent variables in prediction, see Hirschi & Selvin, False Criteria ofCausality
in Delinquency Research, 13 SOc. PROB. 254 (1966).
84. See S. Trrus REID, THE CORRECTIONAL SYSTEM-AN INTRODUCTION 338-39 (1981);
Hoffman & Adelberg, The Salient Factor Score: A Nontechnical Overview, 44 FED. PROBATION 44
(1980).
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and unreasonable use of discretion.8 6  Courts, when determining
whether to grant immunity, should distinguish between the reasonable
use of discretion to make an informed parole decision, and the unrea-
sonable use of discretion to ignore established release criteria.
III. ESTABLISHING A LEGAL DUTY OF CARE: THE MENTAL
PATIENT RELEASE ANALOGUE
The decision to discharge a mentally disturbed offender from in-
voluntary supervision is similar to the parole release decision. Danger-
ous behavior often associated with mental illness 7 requires hospital
personnel to engage in risk assessment calculations 8 tantamount to the
risk assessment calculations of parole officials. Psychiatric experts who
release mental patients must, like parole boards, delicately balance the
need for public safety against the equally important therapeutic value
of reintegrating persons into society. 9
A. The Role of Relationshio and Foreseeability
Courts have frequently used two different approaches in establish-
ing the tort liability of psychotherapists for the release of mental pa-
tients. 90 Under one approach, a legal duty is found in the relationship
86. Official immunity is intended to promote the reasonable use of discretion by precluding
fear of suit. When parole officials knowingly deviate from their statutory duty to promote the
interest of the public and of the parole candidate then they act unreasonably. In such instances,
immunity should be inapplicable. In Palermo v. Rockefeller, 323 F. Supp. 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1971),
the court stated:
When a parole board abandons its statutory duty to make its decision on the basis of an
independent judgment as to whether release of the prisoner will be in the best interests of
the individual and of society.... it no longer acts within the prescribed scope of its
duties or according to the procedures which it is by law required to follow, and it cannot
expect the same measure of deference from the courts.
Id at 484.
87. See H. ROLLIN, THE MENTALLY ABNORMAL OFFENDER AND THE LAW, 39-41, 69 (1969).
88. See, e.g., Eanes v. United States, 407 F.2d 823, 824 (4th Cir. 1968) (calculation of assault-
ive tendencies is commensurate with the risk of release); Baker v. United States, 226 F. Supp. 129,
134-35 (S.D. Iowa 1964) (calculated risks necessary to intelligent and rational pursuit of modem
psychiatric treatment), aft'd, 343 F.2d 222 (8th Cir. 1965). Risk assessment in parole decisions
entails many similar considerations of which the following are included: a critical comparison of
the most recent offense with the inmate's total record; whether the crime committed was premedi-
tated; whether the crime committed was a situational offense; whether the prisoner was reluctant
to admit guilt where guilt was obvious and confirmed. See National Council on Crime and Delin-
quency, Guidesfor Parole Selection, in L. ORLAND, JUSTICE, PUNISHMENT, TREATMENT-THE
CORRECTIONAL PROCESS 427 (1973); note 74 supra and accompanying text.
89. See Note, Torts--GovernmentalImmunit--4bsolute Versus QualfedImmunityfor Public
Officials4Acting in Quasi-Judicial Capacities, 24 WAYNE L. REV. 1513, 1521 & n.55.
90. This note deals only with psychotherapists' liability for mentally disturbed offenders sen-
tenced to treatment rather than to incarceration as the result of criminal prosecution. Excluded
15
Richardson: Civil Liability of Parole Officials for Releasing Dangerous Priso
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1980
TULSA LAW JOURN4L
between the psychotherapist and the victim injured as a result of the
release. Under the alternative approach, a legal duty of care can be
imposed on psychotherapists if the patient's personal history reveals a
pattern of behavior that is sufficiently violent to make future violent
behavior reasonably foreseeable. This section explores the operation of
each approach and briefly examines their applicability to the parole
release decision.
1. The Determinants of Duty
The type of relationship required to support the psychotherapist's
legal duty of care in release decisions can arise in various ways. It can
arise, for example, under a court decree that orders a patient's
mandatory commitment to a mental facility. This approach was used
with success in Semler v. Psychiatric Institute,91 where a hospital was
held liable for negligently releasing a mental patient who later attacked
and killed a young girl. The judgment institutionalizing the patient
had suspended a twenty year prison sentence on the condition that the
patient be remanded for treatment to the custody of the institute. In
critically examining the judgment, the court found that it entailed a
dual purpose of protecting the welfare of the patient and of protecting
the public, particularly young girls.92 The duty to the public was ex-
panded by the court into a special relationship between the hospital
and the patient's victim. This duty was breached when the decision
was made to release the patient, with the result that the hospital was
held liable for the victim's death.93
Another relationship on which a psychotherapist's duty of care has
been based is the relationship between the psychotherapist and the pa-
from discussion are those patients committed through the various forms of civil commitment and
for whom the psychotherapist's duties may markedly differ. See, e.g., Semler v. Psychiatric Inst.,
538 F.2d 121, 124 (4th Cir. 1976) (suspended prison sentence conditioned on continued psychiatric
treatment), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 827 (1976). See note 93 infra and accompanying text. Primarily,
the impact of the type of commitment on duties owed by the practitioner is the consequence of
due process interpretations in Baxtrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
91. 538 F.2d 121 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 827 (1976). The facts in Semler reveal
that John Gilreath had been indicted for the abduction of a young woman. Pending trial,
Gilreath entered the defendants' psychiatric institute for treatment. Later, he was sentenced to
twenty years in prison, but that sentence was suspended on the condition that psychiatric treat-
ment continue. Gilreath's institutionalized status was subsequently changed by doctors to an out-
patient status after which he murdered the plaintiffs daughter.
92. Id at 124.
93. Id at 126. One commentator has compressed the Semler duties into "two analogous
common law duties: the duty to control and the duty to warn potential victims of a patient's
harmfulness." See Comment, Psychotherapists' Liabilhtyfor the Release of Mentally ill Offenders
A Proposed Expansion of the Theory of Strict Liability, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 204, 212 (1977).
[Vol. 16:229
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tient. This approach was successfully utilized in Tarasoff v. Regents of
the University of California,94 where the California Supreme Court re-
viewed the question whether therapists had been negligent in failing to
warn a woman later murdered by the patient. The court, in a contro-
versial opinion, held that the relationship between the therapist and the
patient supported "affirmative duties for the benefit of third persons.
95
The defendant's failure to warn was negligent because the victim was
found to be a member of this protected class.96
One approach that has been effective in establishing a duty of care
94. 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976). This case, often referred to as
Tarasoff I, vacated the California Supreme Court's first opinion in TarasoffI. Tarasoff v. Re-
gents of the Univ. of Cal., 13 Cal. 3d 177, 529 P.2d 553, 118 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1974).
95. The Tarasoffopinion discussed and analyzed the legal duty concept and the sources from
which such duties might emanate. The case was novel because of the liberality with which the
California Supreme Court approached the duty problem. Legal duties, said the court, "are merely
conclusory expressions that, in cases of a particular type, liability should be imposed for damage
done." Id at -, 551 P.2d at 342, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 22. The court discussed the relationship
between foreseeability and legal duty but expressly preferred to impose liability on the basis of the
relationship between the psychotherapist and patient. Id at -, 551 P.2d at 344, 131 Cal. Rptr. at
24. Such a relationship compels the therapist to "assume some responsibility for the safety, not
only of the patient himself, but also of any third person whom the doctor knows to be threatened
by the patient." Id at -, 551 P.2d at 344, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 24.
The decision has been widely criticized and widely praised. One commentator has predicted
that the Tarasoff decision will preclude "effective therapy and consequently will diminish public
safety." Stone, The Tarasoff Decisions: Suing Psychotherapists to Safeguard Society, 90 HARV. L.
REV. 358, 378 (1976). But see Note, Untangling Tarasoff: Tarasoffv. Regents of the University of
California, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 179, 197 (1977). See generally Comment, Discovery of Psychothera-
pist-Patient Communications After Tarasoff, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 265 (1978); Note, Where the
Public Peril Begins: A Survey of Psychotherapists to Determine the Effects of Tarasoff, 31 STAN. L.
REV. 165 (1978); Note, Tarasoffv. Regents of the University of California: Psychotherapist's Obli-
gation of Confidentiality Versus the Duty to Warn, 12 TULSA L.J. 747 (1977).
96. 17 Cal. 3d at -, 551 P.2d at 340, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 20. Tarasoff dealt almost exclusively
with the duty to warn, not with the duty to confine. Compare id at -, 551 P.2d at 340, 131 Cal.
Rptr. at 20 with Semler v. Psychiatric Inst., 538 F.2d 121, 124 (4th Cir. 1977) (duty to confine the
patient), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 827 (1976). The duty to warn was characterized as a ministerial act
to which California's immunity statute was inapplicable. 17 Cal. 3d at _, 551 P.2d at 340, 131
Cal. Rptr. at 20. Conversely, the duty to confine was the corollary of the question whether to
release, a task which could have been successfully characterized as discretionary and to which
statutory immunity would have applied. Id For these reasons, the plaintiffs strictly relied on a
cause of action alleging the failure of the defendants to warn the decedent, despite the court's
intimation that, had official immunity been inapplicable, liability could have been predicated on
the release itself. Id
The distinction between types of duties owed is significant because parole officials do not
enjoy access to the same highly personal information about parole candidates that psychothera-
pists typically obtain with regard to patients in a professional relationship. Hence, parole officials
lack the depth of information normally required to raise a duty to warn particularpersons of an
impending release. Plaintiffs, therefore, unlikely to succeed on such a cause of action, must alter-
natively establish the negligence of the release decision in addition to the ministerial character of
that decision. See note 75 supra and accompanying text. The only remaining option would be the
§ 1983 action under which official immunity might be foreclosed pursuant to Martinez See 444
U.S. at 284 & n.8; see notes 4, 23 & 29 supra and accompanying text.
1980]
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in release decisions was used in the Grimm decision. 97 That approach,
authorized by the Restatement (Second) of Torts,98 provides that one
who assumes responsibility for a foreseeably dangerous individual also
assumes the duty to take reasonable measures to ensure that third per-
sons are not injured by that individual.99 This approach has been used
successfully in actions against parole authorities"° and in actions
against psychotherapists."0 '
Relationship approaches to establishing a legal duty of care in re-
lease decisions are sufficient but unnecessary where it is reasonably
foreseeable that the release will endanger the public.'02 Courts utiliz-
ing foreseeability approaches evaluate the case history of the release
candidate to determine whether dangerous post-release conduct is rea-
sonably foreseeable.' 0 3 If such conduct is reasonably foreseeable, then
97. 115 Ariz. 260, -, 564 P.2d 1227, 1234 (1977); see notes 98 & 99 infra and accompanying
text.
98. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 319, Comment a, Illustration 2 (1965).
99. Id
100. See 115 Ariz. 260, -, 564 P.2d 1227, 1234 (1977).
101. See Semler v. Psychiatric Inst., 538 F.2d 121, 125 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
827 (1976).
102. Cf. Dennert v. United States, 483 F. Supp. 1317, 1322 (D.S.D. 1980). In Dennert, the
plaintiff alleged that the United States was negligent, through its agency the Job Corps, in super-
vising her attacker. The district court held in favor of the United States on several grounds, one
being that the behavior of the attacker had not been reasonably foreseeable. Id at 1322. But see
Tarasoffv. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976). In
Tarasoff, the court found that the relationship approach controlled the question of due care and
declined to decide whether foreseeability alone would have been sufficient to establish a duty of
care. Id at -, 551 P.2d at 343, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
103. In Grimm v. Arizona Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 115 Ariz. 260, 564 P.2d 1227 (1977), the
Arizona Supreme Court relied on the following case history in determining that dangerous post-
release conduct by the releasee was reasonably foreseeable:
Mitchell Blazak was released from the Arizona State Prison after completing approxi-
mately one-third of the sentence imposed on him for armed robbery and assault with
intent to kill. His criminal record began in 1961, when, as a minor, he served a term in
the Fort Grant Industrial School for burglary. In 1964 he was sentenced to prison for
burglary and in 1965 he was returned to prison for parole violation. On September 9,
1966 he was released and in January 1967 was arrested for marijuana possession, armed
robbery and assault with intent to kill. After psychiatric evaluations and several periods
spent in the State Hospital, he was convicted and sentenced to prison.
_d at -, 564 P.2d at 1229.
Another extremely significant factor in Grimm on which the court relied in its finding that
dangerous postrelease conduct was reasonably foreseeable was the prerelease opinions of eight
psychiatrists who had examined Blazak. The court summarized those opinions as follows:
Blazak is "an extremely dangerous person who should not be free in society until some
major psychological changes take place." He is a paranoid schizophrenic whose psycho-
sis prevents him from distinguishing between right and wrong and from controlling his
conduct. He has never made an adequate adjustment to society for any prolonged pe-
riod and is unlikely to change. He has a definite potential for violence. During at least
one hospital stay he seemed to abandon his psychotic behavior but reverted to such
behavior after his release back into society.
Id at -, 564 P.2d at 1230.
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psychotherapists must exercise reasonable care in the release decision
in order to preclude the type of harm suggested by the perceived risk.'°4
2. Substantive Requirements
Courts have imposed upon psychotherapists numerous substantive
requirements incident to the duty to exercise care in release decisions.
First, care must be used to ensure that the patient is not dangerous at
the time of the release and that the patient will not become dangerous
following the release. 105 To ensure adequate compliance with this re-
quirement, courts have further imposed on psychotherapists the duty to
possess the psychiatric acumen and skill appropriate to making in-
formed release decisions.1
6
Courts have also held that release decisions must be the result of
the psychotherapist's best professional judgment. 07 Under this rule,
the psychotherapist must critically examine the patient's recorded per-
sonal history. If material facts in the history are disputed or missing,
an investigation may be required in order to compile an updated and
accurate record from which a release decision can be made. 0 8 Even
then, a release is unwarranted unless, after careful deliberation, the
psychotherapist decides that a release would be best in light of the to-
tality of the circumstances. 0 9 If release is warranted but there are still
lingering doubts about the propriety of release, the psychotherapist
may be required to forewarn particular individuals who might be en-
dangered by the release."10
104. See, e.g., Tarasoffv. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425,-, 551 P.2d 334, 342-
43, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 22-23 (1976).
105. Id
106. See, e.g., Schwenk v. State, 205 Misc. 407, -, 129 N.Y.S.2d 92, 98 (1953).
107. Id at -, 129 N.Y.S.2d at 98-99.
108. See, e.g., Merchants Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 272 F. Supp. 409 (D.N.D.
1967). In Merchant, state hospital agents were found to have been negligent in releasing a mental
patient from institutional supervision. The district court's finding rested principally on proof that
the agents had ignored recommendations advising against release; that records upon which the
release decision was made were incomplete; and that there had been a failure to investigate mate-
rial and disputed issues adequately. Id at 418-19.
109. The best professional judgment rule holds that a mere error of judgment is not of itself a
sufficient basis for liability, as long as the psychotherapist "does what he thinks is best after careful
examination." Schwenk v. State, 205 Misc. 407, -, 129 N.Y.S.2d 92, 98-99 (1953). The rule
reflects the view that psychotherapists are not strictly liable for errors of judgment.
110. See note 96supra and accompanying text; Sf. Tarasoffv. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17
Cal. 3d 425,-, 551 P.2d 334, 347, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 27 (1976) (patient's right to privacy balanced
against the foreseeable victim's right to be warned of possible danger).
19801
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B. An Application to the Parole Decision
The legal duty models implemented in negligent release litigation
are peculiarly suited for application to suits involving allegedly negli-
gent parole decisions."' Shared factors in mental patient and parole
releases include principally the power to decide whether institutional-
ization shall terminate or continue. Also shared by psychotherapists
and parole officials is the burdensome task of defining the substantive
content of the public interest.
In jurisdictions where official immunity is lacking or qualified, pa-
role officials are presumably subject to substantive legal obligations
that are substantially identical to obligations imposed on psychothera-
pists." 2 This follows not only because psychotherapists have been
found to owe significant duties to the public, but because parole offi-
cials owe the public similar duties in their own right." 3 Nevertheless,
many concepts developed in mental patient release litigation can be
grafted to ligitation involving careless parole decisions.
Parole officials are subject to a legal duty of care in parole deci-
sionmaking not only under the logic of Semler, but also under the logic
of Tarasoff.14 Under Semler, parole officials must face the prospect
that orders which institutionalize prisoners also impose upon parole of-
ficials the duty to protect the public, and in some instances particular
persons, from the potentially dangerous conduct of parolees.' 1 Al-
though the applicability of Tarasoff is less clear, that decision can be
interpreted to mean that the relationship between an inmate and parole
officials can have the effect of imposing on the latter "affirmative duties
for the benefit of third persons."' 1 6
Perhaps the most fruitful comparison between parole officials and
psychotherapists should center in the context of shared substantive ob-
ligations. Arguably, parole officials and the systems in which they op-
erate have failed to adhere to the minimum requirements of due care in
parole decisionmaking. Studies reveal, for example, that statutory re-
quirements for the qualification of parole officials generally do not re-
111. Cf. Grimm v. Arizona Bd. ofPardons & Paroles, 115 Ariz. 260,-, 564 P.2d 1227, 1234
(1977) (direct comparison between cases involving negligent mental patient release decisions and
negligent parole release decisions).
112. Id at -, 564 P.2d at 1234.
113. Id
114. See note 96 supra.
115. See note 93 su.pra and accompanying text.
116. See Tarasoffv. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, -, 551 P.2d 334, 343, 131
Cal. Rptr. 14, 23 (1976).
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quire formal training in criminology or related social sciences.' 17
Parole officials may not always possess the minimal acumen and skills
necessary to the informed formulation of parole decisions.
Significant problems exist in parole decisionmaking. The princi-
pal problem is that prisoners who should be released are often not re-
leased while prisoners who are unsuitable for parole may be
discharged. The best professional judgment rule, which requires psy-
chotherapists to use reasonable care in decisions to release mental pa-
tients, appears in the parole context only sporadically if at all. The
same complaint arises with regard to inadequate prerelease investiga-
tions of parole candidates, for whom case histories may be incomplete
or missing. Courts should consider the analogy between mental patient
releases and parole decisions and should show less reluctance to hold
parole officials liable for negligent or reckless parole decisions.
IV. ACTIONS AGAINST PAROLE OFFICIALS UNDER SECTION 1983
Although section 1983 has been uniformly construed to afford
plaintiffs a cause of action against persons who violate protected consti-
tutional rights, courts have nevertheless permitted states to immunize
officials from such actions when the act complained of results from offi-
cial discretion. 18 In effect, the federal bench has deferred to state cre-
ated official immunity at the expense of persons who could not obtain
redress after having been deprived of constitutional rights by state ac-
tion. The Martinez decision is significant because it split from prece-
dent by intimating that such federal self-restraint may be eliminated." 9
This means that persons injured by parolees might now invoke section
1983 to defeat state official immunity and obtain legal redress.
A. Practical Considerations in Section 1983 Actions
Plaintiffs who bring section 1983 actions against parole officials
117. This problem stems from poorly designed statutes that provide few if any criteria for
selecting parole officials. Community responsiveness and expertness are the unspoken criteria.
One commentator points out, however, that "the laws have a long way to go in catching up with
... these standards." D. STANLEY, PRISONERS AMONG Us-THE PROBLEM OF PAROLE 28-29
(1976). One study reported that only eight states have statutory selection criteria for the appoint-
ment of parole officials. Id
118. For a general discussion of the relationship between official immunity and § 1983, see
Theis, Official Immunity andthe Civil Rights Act, 38 LA. L. REv. 279 (1977-78); Comment, Official
Immunity from Damages Under Section 1983 Suits: Wood v. Strickland, 56 ORE. L. REV. 124
(1977); Comment, Liability of State Supervisory Officials Under Section 1983, 22 S.D. L. REv. 369
(1977); note 2 supra and accompanying text.
119. See 444 U.S. at 284 & n.8; see notes 3, 4, 20, 23, 28-29 and accompanying text.
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must observe a complex array of pleading rules. It is imperative that
specific factual allegations be pleaded12 0 and that the facts reveal a con-
stitutional violation that resulted from state action.'12  Once the facts
are specifically alleged the court cannot dismiss the action unless it ap-
pears that the plaintiff will be unable to prove that the facts entitle re-
lief.1 22 The action should furthermore be brought in state court, not in
federal court, in order to avoid complications associated with the elev-
enth amendment's immunity provision.'23 In addition, the action
should be brought against parole officials in their personal capacities
and not against the parole board as a governmental entity.124
Where the crime committed by the parolee results in death to the
victim the plaintiff should specifically allege that the parole decision
deprived the victim of the right to life protected by the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment.12 In the alternative, if the crime
was against property, the plaintiff should allege that the release deci-
sion violated the victim's property rights protected under the due proc-
120. See, e.g., Johnson v. Wells, 566 F.2d 1016, 1017 (5th Cir. 1978).
121. See, e.g., Palermo v. Rockefeller, 323 F. Supp. 478, 483 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). The plaintiff
who sues parole officials under § 1983 must demonstrate that the constitutional violation caused
by the release was a consequence of state action. This can be established in either of two ways.
First, it must be demonstrated that the official immunity, either doctrinal or statutory, promoted a
release decision which precipitated the constitutional violation proscribed by § 1983. This ap-
proach, which was unsuccessfully asserted by the plaintiffs in Martinez, 444 U.S. at 281, seeks to
establish that had the immunity been absent, the release decision and resultant criminal act would
not have occurred.
The second approach for establishing state action inquires whether the parole officials acted
under color of law. Because parole officials are usually state officials or, at the very least, arms of
the state, a parole release decision has been typically characterized as state action. See, e.g., Pa-
lermo v. Rockefeller, 323 F. Supp. at 484. Under this approach, the only remaining question is
whether the state action caused the constitutional violation. Although the causation issue is con-
ceptually separate from the issue of state action, Martinez confused the distinction by handling the
issues in a single question. 444 U.S. at 284-85. This led to the Court's finding that the action by
the parolee "five months later can not be fairly characterized as state action." Id at 285. That
finding was unnecessary, however, because it showed merely that the Court had found that the
parole release had not caused the alleged constitutional violation.
122. See, e.g., Johnson v. Wells, 566 F.2d 1016, 1017 (5th Cir. 1978) (citing Conley v. Gibson,
355 U.S. 41 (1957)).
123. See, e.g., Pate v. Alabama Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 409 F. Supp. 478, 479 (N.D. Ala.
1976) (eleventh amendment immunity held to bar suit). While plaintiffs should sue in state court
to avoid problems with eleventh amendment immunity, it does not necessarily follow that the
state court must accept jurisdiction of the federal claim. In Martinez, the Supreme Court noted
that such an exercise would appear to be consistent with the rule that congressionally imposed
penalties may be enforced in state court where Congress fails to specify the appropriate remedy.
Nevertheless, the Court reserved the question whether states must exercise jurisdiction over § 1983
claims, intimating only that mandatory jurisdiction would be more likely where similar claims
would be enforced if they were to arise under state law. 444 U.S. at 284 & n.7.
124. See note 5 supra.
125. 444 U.S. at 281.
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ess clause. 26 The plaintiff's foremost problem, of course, will be proof
of causation. There must be proof of a plausible connection between
the release decision and the alleged constitutional violation.127
V. CONCLUSION
The reasoning of Martinez coupled with recent judicial criticisms
of official immunity for parole officials suggest that such officials
should be liable for negligent or reckless parole decisions. Develop-
ments in mental patient release litigation with regard to the increasing
legal duties of psychotherapists may be applied with predictable effec-
tiveness in the context of parole decisions, where many similar consid-
erations are involved.
In jurisdictions retaining the doctrine of official immunity for pa-
role officials, plaintiffs should consider the possibility of seeking redress
through section 1983 actions. Such actions may be advantageous not
only because they do not involve the burden of establishing a duty of
care, but because official immunity may be completely precluded once
the elements of section 1983 are affirmatively established. The curious
gap in official immunity opened by Martinez is a significant develop-
ment in parole release litigation which ultimately might improve parole
decisionmaking. Undoubtedly, courts that have been asked to decide
whether to grant official immunity to parole officials have too often
made the mistake of seeing judges in the faces of administrators.
James Michael Richardson
126. Id at 283-84.
127. See note 121 supra and accompanying text.
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